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The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The Disappearing
Cornerstone of the American Law of Marriage
Charles J. Reid, Jr*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article has several related concerns: it is, first of all, an
historical investigation into one of the principal, if unacknowledged,
sources of American juristic thought on marriage—the work of St.
Augustine, the fifth-century North African bishop and doctor of the
Church, who identified as the three essential elements of the marital
relationship procreation, fidelity, and lifelong unity, or permanence.
These three basic elements of St. Augustine’s thought on marriage
were transmitted to the modern era through the work of the medieval
Catholic canon lawyers and theologians and the Anglican canon lawyers
of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Even though the Anglicans
eschewed categorizing marriage as a sacrament—it was the sacramental
quality of marriage that, to St. Augustine, required lifelong unity—
marriage remained a holy estate that demanded the lifetime loyalty of
both parties, even in the face of marital failure. Only truly exceptional
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circumstances permitted one to remarry during the lifetime of one’s
partner.
These ideas took root and flourished in nineteenth-century American
thought on marriage, although they have been seriously challenged over
the last several decades. After exploring the medieval synthesis of St.
Augustine’s thought and its further development by the Anglican canon
lawyers, the final two sections of this paper address what is probably the
most comprehensive challenge to the Augustinian goods—the idea of
same-sex marriage.
As will be made clear below, the marital theory supporting the idea
of same-sex marriage is the principle of affection. Affection is, of course,
a good thing. One shudders to think of affectionless marriages. Such
unions have rightly been the object of satire and scorn in popular
literature and the media. They are hardly healthy or happy environments.
But affection, personal commitment, and love between persons seem
to be insufficient, without more, to provide a coherent foundation for
marriage. What does it mean to say that a marriage is grounded on
“affection”? What if affection, or commitment, vanishes? What if
affection cannot be confined to a single party? What if loyalty shifts?
The Augustinian goods provided a framework for answering these and
other such questions. It is unclear what framework could or should
prevail if the traditional conception of marriage comes to be supplanted.
This Article is divided into four sections. Part II tells the story of the
development of the Augustinian goods of marriage and their
transmission to the modern era. Part III considers the crystallization of
this set of ideas in the work of nineteenth-century American
commentators and courts. By and large these scholars and judges never
mentioned St. Augustine. But they nevertheless continued to operate in a
mental universe shaped to a considerable extent by Augustinian ideals.
Part IV then considers in some detail the implications of the same-sex
marriage decisions of Baehr v. Lewin1 and Baker v. State2 for marital
theory. Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion.

1. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
2. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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II. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS OF MARRIAGE
A. St. Augustine’s Formulation
In his treatise De bono coniugali3 (“On the Good of Marriage”), St.
Augustine sought to answer, in a sense, critics of both the left and the
right. On the one hand were the Manicheans, the immediate target of his
treatise, who maintained that marriage was not a social good at all. The
fourth-century Manichees, to whose number St. Augustine had himself
belonged in his youth, viewed the souls of human beings as consisting of
sparks of light imprisoned within the created material order.4 The goal of
the enlightened, on this theory, was to free the light and allow it to travel
heavenward by refusing to cooperate with the created order. This refusal
took the form of abstention from reproductive intercourse.5 “It is good to
hate one’s body,” was the lesson of the Manichees.6
If the Manicheans formed one wing of the debate, then the old pagan
order of ancient Rome formed the other. Marriage, according to the
ancient Roman legal sources, was chiefly an institution for protecting the
assets and interests of the elites. It was the means by which men and
women of proper social backgrounds might unite their interests,
reproduce, and transmit their wealth to the next generation.7 Unlike
Christians, pagan Romans did not view marriage as the exclusive outlet
for sexuality. Concubinage, prostitution, and other types of sexual
relationships were permitted under Roman law.8 Marriage, on this model,
existed for the purposes of bringing into being households that served the
economic, political, and dynastic interests of the elite. It did not exist for
some larger, transcendent purpose. It was freely dissolvable through
divorce if the proper formalities were observed.9

3. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, DE SANCTA VIRGINITATE 2 (P.G. Walsh, ed.,
2001).
4. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE
CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS 107-112 (enl. ed., 1986).
5. Id. at 108-111.
6. Id. at 112.
7. The Roman term familia reflected this understanding of the marital relationship: “From late
antiquity into the Middle Ages, the most common meaning of familia continued to be the property or the
dependents (sometimes only the servants) of the household head.” See DAVID HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL
HOUSEHOLDS 3 (1985).
8. James Brundage observes, after reviewing the evidence regarding the Roman practices of
concubinage and prostitution: “Romans generally tolerated a wide variety of other sexual practices.”
JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 27 (University of
Chicago 1987). Among the practices Brundage identifies are masturbation and homosexual relations. Id.
9. See PERCY ELLWOOD CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 218-249 (University Press,
Oxford 1969) (1930).
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St. Augustine developed his theory of the goods of marriage with
both of these schools of thought in mind. He sought specifically to
synthesize Christian revelation with elements of Stoic philosophy and
grounded his analysis on his vision of the nature of the human person.
“Every human person,” St. Augustine commenced his treatise, “is a part
of the human race and, by virtue of human nature, has a kind of
sociability.”10 Indeed, St. Augustine emphasized that God created all
persons from a single human being so that everyone might be bound
together by a kind of “bond of relationship” (cognationis vinculo).11
Friendship was thus a natural state of affairs based on the relationships
that bound all persons, and marriage was its highest expression.
St. Augustine moved at once from this foundation to explain that the
first manifestation “of this natural human society” was the sexual joining
of man and woman.12 Referring once again to the divine act of creation,
St. Augustine observed that God did not create man and woman as
strange and separate creatures alien from each other.13 Rather, He created
the woman from the side of the man, thus signaling the power of their
enduring union.14 Side by side, man and woman are thus joined, and so
they proceed on the same path, planning and cooperating together.15
Rejecting his Manichean past, St. Augustine affirmed that “the
marriage of man and woman is something good.”16 Augustine dedicated
the remainder of his inquiry to exploring why this should be so. It was
not, he concluded, solely because of procreation. There was, he asserted,
“a natural companionship between the sexes.”17 It would otherwise not
be possible to speak of marriages among the elderly, where procreation
was hardly possible.18 Among the elderly, Augustine acknowledged, it
was a common and praiseworthy thing to find that they have renounced
sexual relations yet retain an even purer, more powerful relationship for

10. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 2 (“Quoniam unusquisque homo humani generis pars
est, et sociale quiddam est humana natura . . . habet . . . .”).
11. Id. On the significance of cognatio at Roman law, see ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ROMAN LAW 393 (1953); and W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO
JUSTINIAN, 370-371 3d ed. rev. by Peter Stein (1963).
12. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 3.3, at 6. (“[A]liquid boni esse coniugium masculi et feminae . . . .”).
17. Id. (“Quod mihi non videtur propter solam filiorum procreationem, sed propter ipsam etiam
naturalem in diverso sexu societatem.” ) (“It does not seem to me [to be a good] solely because of the
procreation of sons, but also because a natural companionship between the sexes”).
18. Id.
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having done so.19 Thus it was not procreation alone that made marriage
good.
St. Augustine therefore concluded that there must be a second
good of marriage, which he identified as fidelity – the loyalty of one
spouse toward the other. Augustine looked to St. Paul for guidance on
this matter. In First Corinthians, Paul declared that “a woman does not
have power over her body, but the man; similarly, the man does not have
power over his body, but the woman.”20 This power over the body of the
other St. Augustine took as evidence of the extreme loyalty married
persons are required to show toward one another. Fidelity to the person
of the other spouse was understood by Augustine as so valuable that it
should count more than the bodily health which sustained life itself.21
Betrayal of this loyalty was the practical disowning of one’s own body.
Marriage, Augustine continued, had yet a third good. Augustine
developed the argument in favor of this good obliquely, using as his
starting point the good of procreation. May someone put aside a barren
spouse in order to marry one who was not barren?22 This, St. Augustine
admonished, is forbidden by the divine law.23 Even where the spouses
are unable to procreate, even where one spouse has abandoned the other,
Augustine asserted, they remain symbolically bound to one another.24
This symbolic or sacramental bond is so enduring that divorce cannot
break it. Even should a couple divorce, they would commit adultery if
they attempted marriage with others.25 The Roman pagans married and
divorced without guilt, Augustine observed, and Moses, because of the
“hardness” of the hearts of the Israelites, permitted a man to repudiate his
wife.26 But among Christians, “in our city of God,” a different rule
applied.27 Marriage in the Christian dispensation was a lifelong unity of
persons not to be broken by the merely personal judgments of the parties.
B. The Synthesis of the High Middle Ages
These three basic goods, these three basic values, as it were,
provided the philosophical foundation for the marriage law of the middle

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. § 4.4, at 8. Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:4.
AUGUSTINE, supra note 3, § 4.4, at 8.
Id. § 7.7, at 16.
Id. The term St. Augustine uses for “divine law” is divina regula.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 8.7.
Id. § 7.7 (in civitate dei nostri).
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ages. One might take as representative the work of the twelfth-century
canonist Gratian.
Although knowledge of Gratian’s accomplishments today is largely
restricted to specialist audiences, his feat of legal organization, brought
to fruition about the year 1140, was one of the most important
contributions in the whole history of western law. Harold Berman has
described Gratian’s work as “the first comprehensive and systematic
legal treatise in the history of the West, and perhaps in the history of
mankind—if by ‘comprehensive’ is meant the attempt to embrace
virtually the entire law of a given polity, and if by ‘systematic’ is meant
the express effort to present that law as a single body, in which all the
parts are viewed as interacting to form a whole.”28 Although little is
known about Gratian the man,29 his use of the scholastic method of
dialectics—a question-and-answer format leading to synthesis of
seeming opposites—remains a staple of legal reasoning even today.30
Gratian premised his analysis of marriage, as did St. Augustine, on
its procreative purpose. Those who couple together, not for procreative
purposes, but merely for the satisfaction of lust are to be accounted not
married persons but fornicators.31 Those who employ the “poisons of
sterility” (sterilitatis venena) to frustrate the procreative purpose of
marriage are also to be accounted as fornicators,32 while those who
procure an abortion after the soul has infused into the unborn child’s
body are guilty of homicide.33 Procreation was not an absolute
requirement of married life: those unable to have or bear children might
nevertheless validly marry.34 But the possibility of procreation was not to
be frustrated by the parties themselves.
Gratian, furthermore, interwove his theory of marital fidelity and
indissolubility into his theory of marital consent. He began by
considering whether it was consent to a common way of life that made a
marriage, or rather the sexual relations between parties who have so

28. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 143 (1983).
29. The most important treatment of the available biographical data concerning Gratian is John T.
Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the Father of the Systematic Study of Canon
Law, 35 TRADITTIO 145 (1979). On the composition of Gratian’s DECRETUM one must now consult the
pathbreaking work of Anders Winroth. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM
(2000). For this work, Winroth has been made the recipient of a MacArthur Foundation grant.
30. See Berman, supra note 28, at 151-164; see also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON
LAW 44-69 (1995) (summarizing Gratian’s method and accomplishments).
31. See C. 32, q. 2, d.p.c. 1.
32. C. 32, q. 2, c. 7. The phrase sterilitatis venena occurs in the rubric.
33. C. 32, q. 2, c. 8.
34. C. 32, q. 2, d.p.c. 16.
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consented.35 He concluded, based on the weight of patristic authorities
that it was indeed consent that made a marriage, not copulation.36
He did not, however, leave the analysis there. Sexual relations
between married persons imparted to the union a special firmness. A
consummated, ratified union among Christians, Gratian taught, might
only be dissolved where it could be shown that one or both of the parties
were gravely impeded from consenting to the marriage or from fulfilling
the terms of that consent.37 Parties who separated from one another might
be able to move to a new relationship only where a competent
ecclesiastical tribunal recognized that the old marriage failed not because
of any defect subsequent to the exchange of consent, but where the
consent itself was ineffective.38
This teaching became the common currency of the canonists and
theologians of the middle ages.39 The work of Peter Lombard and
Thomas Aquinas might be taken as representative. The principal reason
for marriage, Peter asserted, was the procreation of children.40 It was to
fulfill His command to “increase and multiply” that God first instituted
marriage, Peter taught.41
The three goods of marriage, Peter continued, embraced procreation,
fidelity, and sacramental unity.42 The good of fidelity, Peter asserted, was
sufficient to stand against all acts of infidelity.43 That one might not
become sexually involved with another following marriage was the
unbreakable rule.44 And the good of sacramental unity, Peter concluded,
prevented one from remarrying even after canonical separation, except in
those cases where an annulment had been obtained because of a failure
of consent.45
Thomas Aquinas, for his part, recognized that marriage was founded
on the natural law: true, he conceded, it was not natural in the sense that
all God’s creatures, human and non-human alike, married in order to
have children. But, Thomas made clear, marriage was a natural
35. See C. 27, q. 2, cc. 1-15.
36. C. 27, q. 2, d.p.c. 15.
37. See Brundage, supra note 8, at 242-245.
38. Id.
39. On the relationship of law and theology in the middle ages, see Alain Boureau, Droit et
théologie au XIII siècle, 47 ANNALES ESC 1113 (1992); and John van Engen, From Practical Theology to
Divine Law: The Work and Mind of the Medieval Canonists, PROC. NINTH INT’L CONGRESS MEDIEVAL
CANON LAW 873 (1997).
40. See PETER LOMBARD, SENTENTIARUM LIBRI QUATTUOR, 671, Bk. IV, dist. 30 (Paris, 1892).
41. Id.
42. Id. dist. 31, at 672.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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inclination of the human species and was intended for the procreation
and education of children.46 This education was to consist of training in
the virtues and should include lessons from both mother and father.47
This much was the endowment—”the treasure”—that parents left their
children.48 Similarly, Thomas argued, marriage also embraced the good
of fidelity: through the marriage vow, man and woman placed
themselves in the power of the other.49 The keeping of the marital vow,
Thomas asserted, was not only a matter of theological virtue but a
positive demand of justice.50 Finally, Thomas concluded, marriage was
indissoluble.51 It was, after all, a sacrament and a sign of Jesus Christ’s
own union with the Church.52
C. The Anglican Canon Lawyers of the Early Modern Period
The Protestant Reformation challenged some aspects of the
Augustinian framework that the medieval canonists and theologians had
constructed. John Witte has shown that in some respects the Lutheran
and Calvinist reformers of the sixteenth century deepened the
Augustinian goods by, for instance, connecting the faithfulness
demanded in marriage with the protection marriage offered from sexual
sins.53 In other respects, however, these Protestant reformers moved
away from the Augustinian goods, particularly on the subject of the
indissolubility of the marital union. Marriage, although a sanctified form
of life and a holy estate, was not to be counted among the sacraments.54
Hence, divorce with the possibility of remarriage was permitted, at least
by the innocent spouse in cases of “[a]dultery, desertion, or
cruelty . . . .”55
On the other hand, as perhaps befit a Church that claimed to
represent a via media between Catholicism and Protestantism, the

46. See ST. AUGUSTINE, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, SUPPLEMENTUM, Q. 41, art. 1, resp. (“Primo,
quantum ad principalem ejus finem, qui est bonum prolis. Non enim intendit natura solum generationem
prolis, sed etiam traductionem et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis, in quantum homo est,
qui est virtutis status”) (“First, as to [marriage’s] principal end, which is the good of children: nature
intends not only the procreation of children, but also their upbringing and their training in the perfect state
of man, which is the state of virtue”).
47. Id. See also id. at art. II, resp. 1.
48. Id.
49. See id. at resp. 3.
50. Id. at resp. 2.
51. Id. at resp. 4.
52. Id.
53. See John Witte, The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1046
(2001).
54. Id. at 1052.
55. Id.
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structure of Anglican canon law, as expounded by its principal teachers
in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, reflected the three classical
Augustinian goods even though the English canonists seldom credited St.
Augustine as their source. Thus, Thomas Oughton, in an analysis of the
marital impediments that drew deeply from medieval sources, noted that
marriage was ordained both for the avoidance of fornication and for the
procreation of children (d. 1740).56
John Ayliffe (1676-1732) made specific mention of the “threefold
matrimonial Good” in the course of his analysis of marriage.57 Marriage,
as Ayliffe defined it, “is a lawful coupling and joining together of Man
and Woman in one individual State or Society of Life, during the
Lifetime of one of the Parties.”58 The “papists,” Ayliffe observed,
retained the three-fold good of “Fides [fidelity], Proles [children], and
Sacramentum [“sacramental unity”].”59 Although distancing himself
from this formulation by attributing it to the “papists,” the only criticism
Ayliffe offered involved the Roman Church’s practice of not allowing
the clergy to marry.60 Ayliffe otherwise maintained silence on the
continued vitality of the goods.
But even if Anglican theology no longer retained marriage as one of
the sacraments,61 and even though a writer like Ayliffe put some distance
between himself and the Augustinian goods, the structure of Anglican
marriage law was fundamentally shaped by the Augustinian goods. Thus,
for instance, adultery remained a crime punishable by the English courts
of common law or, where members of the clergy were concerned, by the
ecclesiastical courts.62
The retention of the Augustinian goods of marriage as the basic
framework for analyzing marriage issues was especially evident in the
treatment the law accorded divorce.
The medieval canon law had recognized two types of divorce, a
vinculo (which had the effect of dissolving the marital bond), and a

56. See THOMAS OUGHTON, ORDO JUDICIARIUS 286 (London, 1738), vol. I.
57. See JOHN AYLIFFE, PARERGON JURIS CANONICI ANGLICANI 360 (London, 1726).
58. Id. at 359.
59. Id. at 360.
60. Id. (“For to forbear Marriage is not a necessary Means to preserve Chastity, as we may learn
from the lewd and scandalous Practices of the Romish Clergy, who commit such frequent Acts of
Whoredom and Adultery . . . .” ).
61. See NORMAN DOE, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A CRITICAL
STUDY IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 368 (1996) (“Theologically, holy matrimony is treated in the
Church of England not as a sacrament but as sacramental in nature.” ); see also GARTH MOORE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH CANON LAW 82 (1967).
62. See JOHN GODOLPHIN, REPORTORIUM CANONICUM: OR AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE
ECCLESIASTICAL LAWS OF THIS REALM CONSISTENT WITH THE TEMPROAL 469 (1687). Godolphin notes
that “By the Laws of William the Conqueror the Adulterer was to be put to death.” Id. at 470.
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mensa et thoro (which removed the obligation of common life, but did
not free the parties to remarry). Divorce a vinculo was a practical
consequence of the Augustinian good of sacramental unity. Only a flaw
in the act of consent—say, because one of the parties had been forced
into marriage or was actually a different person than alleged to be—
might result in the dissolution of the bond itself. But divorce a mensa et
thoro on account of adultery, or because one of the parties had fallen into
heresy, or was excessively cruel—the three classical grounds of
separation—did not carry with it the right of remarriage.63
The Anglican canon lawyers retained this basic distinction well into
the eighteenth century. Thus, Richard Grey, writing in 1732, retained the
original medieval language when he explained the divorce law then
prevailing in England:
Q: How many Kinds are there of Divorce?
A: Two: Separation a Thoro & Mensa and Separation a Vinculo.
Q: What is Separation a Thoro et Mensa?
A: Separation from Bed and Board: And this is in cases of Adultery,
Cruelty, etc., in which the Marriage, having been originally good, is not
dissolved; . . . .
Q: What is Separation a Vinculo?
A: That which annuls or dissolves the very Bond of Matrimony . . . .
Q: What are the Effects of that original Voidance and Nullity?
A: The Wife is barred of Dower, and the Issue is illegitimate, and the
Persons so divorced may marry any others; . . .64

Richard Burn, in his comprehensive exposition of ecclesiastical law,
engaged in much the same analysis, at points repeating Grey nearly word
for word.65 Edmund Gibson, (1669-1748), librarian of Lambeth Palace
and, eventually, Anglican Bishop of London, included in his compilation
of canon law secular legislation of King James I prohibiting remarriage
following divorce and declaring violations of the statute to be capital
felonies.66

63. See CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY: RIGHTS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 294-302 (typescript, 2003).
64. See RICHARD GREY, A SYSTEM OF ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 146 (2d ed., 1732).
65. See RICHARD BURN, II ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 428-430 (2d ed., 1757).
66. See EDMUND GIBSON, I CODEX JURIS ECCLESIASTICI ANGLICANI 508. As the statute as
excerpted by Gibson put it: “That if any person or persons within his Majesties Dominions of England
and Wales, being married, or which hereafter shall marry, do at any time . . . marry any other person or
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John Godolphin sought to reconcile legislation of this sort with the
standard Protestant teaching – common on the European Continent – that
innocent parties to marriages broken apart by adultery were free to
wed.67 To be sure, St. Matthew’s Gospel seemed to allow this
interpretation, Godolphin noted, but this must be balanced by reference
to the texts of St. Luke and St. Mark and, most especially, St. Paul’s
admonition in 1 Corinthians that “a wife is bound to her husband as long
as he lives. But if her husband dies, she is free to be married to
whomever she wishes, provided that it be in the Lord.”68 Even though
Godolphin conceded that Protestant jurists of the Continent, like Hugo
Grotius, took a different view and endorsed the right of remarriage, at
least for innocent parties, “the ancient Canons of the Church, and the
Constitutions of our English Reformation, have not thought fit to permit
such liberty . . . .”69
III. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW
A. Chancellor Kent and the Natural Law of Marriage
Chancellor James Kent (1763-1847), among the early leaders of the
New York bench and bar, was extraordinarily influential in the shaping
of American law.70 He was also a believing Christian who understood
Christian principles as the bedrock upon which the law of the new
American nation was founded. In a decision issued in 1811, Kent upheld
a blasphemy conviction even in the absence of a New York statute,
reasoning that the people of New York “profess the general doctrines of
Christianity.”71 “Whatever strikes at the root of Christianity,” Kent
asserted, “tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil government.”72
persons, the former husband or wife being alive, that then every such offence shall be felony, and the
person and persons so offending shall suffer death as in cases of felony . . . .” Id.
67. See GODOLPHIN, supra note 62, at 493-499.
68. Id. at 498. Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:39.
69. GREY, supra note 64. Grey noted that in exceptional cases Parliament might by special act
grant divorce with the right to remarry:
Q: May not the innocent Party, in case of Adultery, marry again?
A: No: by the Doctrine of the Canon Law, and the antient Constitutions of the English
Church, grounded upon two remarkable Texts of Scripture, Mark X. 11, and 1 Cor. vii
11. But because our Saviour in another Place prohibiting Divorces and new Marriages
thereon, specially excepts the Case of Fornication, it seems unreasonable that the
Innocent should suffer for the Crime of another; and upon this Principle several Acts of
Parliament, for the Divorce of particular Persons in the Case of Adultery, have expressly
allowed a Liberty to the innocent Person of marrying again.
70. See CHARLES J. REID, JR., “JAMES KENT,” IN AMERICAN CONSEVATISM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Bruce P. Frohnen, ed., forthcoming, 2003).
71. See Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Rep. 343 (1811).
72. Id.
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An ardent defender of the natural law, Kent was known to approach
legal issues with a keen appreciation of the unwritten natural law
inscribed on the hearts of all persons.73 In his Commentaries, written
following his retirement from the bench, during his teaching days at
Columbia University, Kent described the transcendent significance of the
marital relationship:
The primary and most important of the domestic relations, is that of
husband and wife. It has its foundation in nature, and is the only lawful
relation by which Providence has permitted the continuance of the
human race. In every age, it has had a propitious influence on the moral
improvement and happiness of mankind. It is one of the chief
foundations of social order. We may justly place to the credit of
marriage, a great share of the blessings which flow from refinement of
manners, the education of children, the sense of justice, and the
cultivation of the liberal arts.74

In his capacity as Chancellor, Kent authored a significant opinion on
the subject of the relationship of natural law and marriage. In Wightman
v. Wightman, Kent was afforded the opportunity to apply the principles
of the natural law to a question of marriage law because, as Kent
observed, the New York law of his day, unlike probably any other
jurisdiction “in the Christian world,”75 “[had] no statute regulating
marriage, or prescribing the solemnities of it, or defining the forbidden
degrees.”76
The issue in Wightman was whether the petitioner, who persuasively
alleged that she was temporarily insane at the time of her marriage, was
capable of exchanging valid consent.77 Kent took notice of what he
considered the peculiar situation of American jurisprudence: although
there were no ecclesiastical courts in the new nation, American courts
were nevertheless charged with enforcing the natural duties of the marital
relationship. As Kent put it: “Are the principles of natural law, and of
Christian duty, to be left unheeded, and inoperative, because we have no
ecclesiastical Courts recognized by law, as specially charged with the
cognizance of such matters?”78

73. An example of Kent’s natural-law based reasoning is found in Gardner v. Trustees of the
Village of Newbergh 2 Johns. Rep. 162 (1816), in which Kent awarded compensation for the taking of
commercial property even in the absence of an eminent domain statute allowing for the payment of such
an award.
74. See James Kent, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 77-76 (3d ed., 1838).
75. See Wightman, 4 Johns. Rep. at 347 (1811).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 343-344.
78. Id. at 345.
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Kent was not inclined to leave the natural law a dead letter,
unenforceable by the courts. He proposed to define the natural law as it
pertained to the case before him: “[B]y the law of nature I understand
those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator has prescribed to
man, as from the deductions of right reason, though they may be more
precisely known, and more explicitly declared by divine revelation.”79
Kent imputed to Chancery Court the power to decide matters of
matrimonial law, even in the absence of clear statutory authorization.80
Kent was comfortable in relying upon the natural law because he did not
see it as some arbitrary and subjective body of moral norms, but as a
body of principles exemplified to a considerable degree in the canon and
the common law and therefore generally knowable.81 “If it were
otherwise, there would be a most deplorable and distressing imperfection
in the administration of justice.”82
Kent relied upon these principles in order to rule that capacity to
contract was a requirement of valid marriage.83 Kent took the opportunity
to consider the broader application of the natural law to questions of
matrimony. Stepping outside the scope of the question directly presented,
Kent further considered and rejected the possibility that incestuous
relationships might ever be recognized by New York: “Prohibitions of
the natural law are of absolute, uniform, and universal obligation. They
become rules of the common law, which is founded in the common

79. Id. at 348.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 347. This overt commitment to the principles of the canon law remained a feature of
New York jurisprudence. In a case involving an allegation of female impotence, the Chancery Court of
New York acknowledged the relationship of New York domestic relations law with English ecclesiastical
law in order to require the provision of some evidence of impotence beyond the declarations of the
parties. The Court explained the canonistic roots of this doctrine:
The Revised Statutes have authorized a proceeding of this kind at the suit of the injured
party, against the party whose incapacity it alleged. But it is expressly declared that no
sentence of nullity shall be pronounced solely on the confessions or declarations of the
parties; and the court is in all cases to require other satisfactory evidence of the existence
of the facts on which the allegation of nullity is founded. This last provision was
absolutely necessary to guard against fraud and collusion in such cases, and is stricly in
accordance with the requirements of the ecclesiastical or canon law.
Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige Ch. 554, 555 (1836).
The Davenbagh Court subsequently added: “When the legislature conferred this branch of its jurisdiction
upon the Court of Chancery, it was not intended to adopt a different principle from that which had
theretofore existed in England, and indeed in all Christian countries . . . .” Id. at 556.
The idea that canon law provided a framework for analyzing marriage cases remained alive even in the
latter nineteenth century. The Nevada Supreme Court wrote in 1882: “The law of marriage and divorce,
as administered by the ecclesiastical courts, is a part of the common law of this country, except as it has
been altered by statutes.” Wuest v. Wuest, 17 Nev. 217, 30 P. 886, 887 (1882).
82. See Kent, supra note 74, at 347.
83. Id. at 344.
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reason and acknowledged duty of mankind, sanctioned by immemorial
usage, and, as such are clearly binding.”84
Natural law was thus binding always and everywhere. Even in the
absence of positive statutory enactment, marriage might thus be
recognized and given force by the judiciary since its basic norms, its
structure, and its fundamental goods and goals were inscribed on the
hearts of all persons of good will and knowable through reason. The
accumulated wisdom of the great writers on marriage, including the
canonists of the middle ages and the Anglican canon lawyers of the
English ecclesiastical courts might be consulted as a source of
enlightenment and elucidation when doubtful questions arose. Kent,
furthermore, was not alone in his endorsement of natural law as the
foundation of American matrimonial law. It was the common
understanding of the age.85
B. The Procreative Purpose of Marriage
When it came to giving specific content to the natural law of
marriage, nineteenth-century American commentators and courts tended
to look to the Augustinian goods of marriage, which had become,
through the medium of the English ecclesiastical writers, the common
deposit of legal teaching. Echoing the Augustinian analysis, as mediated
through the Anglican canon law, Joel Bishop, one of the most important
treatise writers of the nineteenth century,86 declared:
As the first cause and reason of matrimony,” says Ayliffe, “ought to be
the design of having an offspring, so the second ought to be the
avoiding of fornication.” These two, observes Dr. Lushington, the law
recognizes as its “principal ends;” namely, “a lawful indulgence of the
passions to prevent licentiousness and the procreation of children,
according to the evident design of Divine Providence.87

84. Id. at 250. Chancellor Kent was far from alone in ascribing a natural-law origin and content to
marriage. Thus the Vermont Supreme Court wrote in 1829: “To marry is one of the natural rights of
human nature, instituted in a state of innocence for the protection thereof; and was ordained by the great
Lawgiver of the universe, and not to be prohibited by man.” See Overseers of the Poor for the Town of
Newberry v. Overseers of the Poor for the Town of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 158 (1829).
85. Thus Bouvier wrote: “Marriage owes its institution to the law of nature, and its perfection to
the municipal or civil law. . . . As an institution established by nature, it consists in the free and voluntary
consent of both parties, in the reciprocal faith they pledge to each other.” JOHN BOUVIER, 1 INSTITUTES
OF AMERICAN LAW 101 (1851).
86. On Bishop’s importance, see Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST.
REV 222 (1995).
87. See JOEL BISHOP, 1 NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION 326
(quoting John Ayliffe, PARERGON, 360; and Deane v. Aveling, 1 Rob. Ec. 279, 298) (1891).
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The procreative purpose of marriage was also a steady feature of
nineteenth-century case law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in 1847,
declared:
The great end of matrimony is not the comfort and convenience of the
immediate parties, though these are necessarily embarked in it; but the
procreation of a progeny having a legal title to maintenance by the
father; . . . [T]he paramount purpose of the marriage [is] the procreation
and protection of legitimate children, the institution of families, and the
creation of natural relations among mankind; from which proceed all
the civilization, virtue, and happiness to be found in the world.88

One finds this principle being asserted again in 1862, by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. That Court was confronted
with a difficult problem of fraud: a husband learned following the
marriage ceremony that his wife had become pregnant by another man
shortly before the marriage.89 The Court ruled the marriage invalid
because the wife, at the time consent was exchanged, was unable to
fulfill the most important purpose of the marital relationship:
[O]ne of the leading and most important objects of the institution of
marriage under our laws is the procreation of children, who shall with
certainty be known by their parents as the pure offspring of their union.
A husband has a right to require that his wife shall not bear to his bed
aliens to his blood and lineage. This is implied in the very nature of the
contract of marriage.90

The Missouri Supreme Court, confronting a complicated question of
marriage and dower involving a white man who had married a Native
American woman in his youth and subsequently married a white woman,
reasoned:
[W]hen there is a cohabitation, by consent, for an indefinite period of
time, for the procreation and bringing up of children, that, in a state of
nature, would be a marriage; and in the absence of all civil and
religious institutions, may safely be presumed to be, as it is termed by
some writers, “a marriage in the sight of God.”91

C. Marital Fidelity
Fidelity, St. Augustine’s second great good of marriage, was also
recognized and given life by the American courts. The Vermont Supreme

88.
89.
90.
91.
Divorce).

Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847).
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. 605 (1862).
Id. at 610.
Johnson v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 30 Mo. 72, 85-86 (1860) (quoting Shelford on Marriage and
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Court, acknowledging the importance of fidelity, denounced as a
violation of “the municipal law” and “the moral or divine law” the crime
of adultery, whether committed by the married person himself or herself,
or that party’s unmarried partner.92 Adultery, the Court observed,
amounted to “filthiness and criminality” and should not be tolerated.93 A
concurring opinion in a Georgia Supreme Court case explained that
statutes against adultery and seduction had as their purpose the protection
of “the sacred promise of marriage—the promise to become one—the
promise of taking the vow of love and fidelity and protection for
life . . . .”94
Courts also called attention to statutory enactments that required
fidelity as an element of marriage. The California Supreme Court noted
that the obligations of marriage, assumed by all who undertake that
contract, included “mutual respect, fidelity, and support.”95 Citing
statutory authority, an Ohio Court declared: “Husband and wife contract
towards each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support.”96
The Louisiana Supreme Court repeated the argument of counsel in
asserting that “The conclusion to be derived from consideration of the
different articles of the code appears to be an unavoidable one. Mutual
fidelity, support and assistance are enjoined . . . upon the husband and
wife. Their relations, each to the other, presuppose as much.”97
A pre-Civil War Ohio case stressed the relationship between fidelity
and free consent: because marriage demanded fidelity, consent had to be
the result of “the utmost freedom of choice, and between persons of
matured judgment and discretion.”98 An 1882 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stressed that marriage required of the husband “his
allegiance and fidelity to his wife [and] an obligation of support . . . .”99
The right to marital faithfulness, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court asserted, was a primary expectation of the parties. Speaking
specifically of the wife, the Court held: “There is no more important
right of the wife than that, which secures to her in the marriage relation

92. See Shattuck v. Hammond, 46 Vt. 466, 470 (1874).
93. Id.
94. Wood v. State of Georgia, 48 Ga. 192, 295 (1873) (Trippe, J., concurring).
95. Livingston v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 49 P. 836, 837 (Cal. 1897) (quoting
California Civil Code sec. 155).
96. Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 264, 264 (Ct. Common Pleas, 1894).
97. Zerega v. Percival, 15 So. 476, 484 (La. 1894).
98. Shafher v. State of Ohio, 20 Ohio 1, 6 (1851).
99. Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 216 (1882). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had said much the
same: “A man owes to his wife affection, fidelity, and protection.” See Richards v. Richards, 1 Grant 389,
392 (Pa. 1856).
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the companionship of her husband and the protection of his home.”100
The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that a father whose adultery
led to the breakup of his marriage could not thereafter obtain legal
custody of his child.101 “[T]he father should not be permitted, when his
own violation of duty had produced a dissolution of the marriage tie, to
deprive the mother of her child to which she was entitled by fidelity to
the marriage vow.”102
The Kansas Supreme Court stressed the relationship of marital
fidelity to marital stability and the larger social goods thereby served:
Every one is fully aware that the happiness of the domestic circle, the
preservation of the concord and confidence that should exist between
husband and wife, depends largely, if not absolutely, on the
maintenance of mutual confidence of the parties in the chastity and
fidelity of each other. . . . The moral progress of the race, the purity of
society, depends absolutely on home influences and surroundings.103

The Tennessee Supreme Court similarly spoke for the unconscious
Augustinianism of the age when it wrote:
The marriage contract is peculiar, and in many respects different from
all others. It is for life, and the parties have no power, by mutual
consent, to dissolve it. The moment it is solemnized, society, for the
wisest reasons, is interested in the fidelity with which it shall be
observed; and it cannot be annulled, without the consent of the
tribunals of the country, specially clothed with such power.104

D. Marital Permanence
As the Tennessee Supreme Court intimated, the good of fidelity was
closely connected with the idea of marital permanence. The American
commentators and courts emphatically rejected the Augustinian ideal,
crystallized and given juridic definition by the medieval canonists and
theologians, that marriage was a sacrament—a sign and symbol of God’s
enduring love. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put it, “The absurdity
of the dogma, that marriage is a sacrament, and dissoluble only by the

100. Magrath v. Magrath, 103 Mass. 570, 579 (1870). Magrath was concerned, strictly speaking,
not with infidelity, but with spousal abandonment.
101. See Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423 (1860).
102. Id. at 439.
103. Masterman v. Masterman, 51 P. 277, 280 (Kan. 1897).
104. Cameron v. Cameron, 42 Tenn. 375, 376-377 (1865).

10REID.MACRO

466

5/26/2004 12:03 AM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

head of the church, instead of a political status subject to the power of
the state, is manifest.”105
But while marriage was not sacramental, in any juridic sense,
nineteenth-century legal authorities nevertheless emphasized the
importance of marital permanence. Chancellor Kent, in the course of
reviewing the experiences of the ancient world and of modern Europe,
asserted: “[T]he stronger authority, and the better policy, are in favour of
the stability of the marriage union.”106 The Roman practice of liberal
divorce, Kent concluded, was “injurious and shameful.”107 The Roman
“facility of separation tended to destroy all mutual confidence and to
inflame every trifling dispute.”108 This divorce mentality prevailed “until
it was finally subdued by the influence of Christianity.”109
Kent favored the restrictive approach to divorce and was grateful that
American states tended to share his reluctance. In several states, Kent
observed, “no divorce is granted, but by a special act of the legislature,
according to the English practice.”110 Kent especially singled out the
state of South Carolina. At the time of his writing, Kent agreeably noted
regarding South Carolina, “there is no instance . . . since the revolution,
of a divorce of any kind, either by the sentence of a court of justice, or by
act of the legislature.”111 On the other hand, there were also states and
territories that conferred jurisdiction over divorce to the courts, but even
in these instances the grounds of absolute divorce, with right of
remarriage, were generally limited to adultery.112 And where one
attempted to marry while bound to another he or she broke the law:
“No person can marry while the former husband or wife is living.
Such second marriage is, by the common law, absolutely null and void,

105. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847); accord, Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester, 2 N.H.
268, 278 (1820) (“It is one of the corruptions of popery, that marriage itself is a ‘sacrament”). The
Alabama Supreme Court, on the other hand, declared:
Marriage is a divine institution, and, although in some respects it may partake of the
nature and character of ordinary contracts, it has, with few exceptions, always considered
as standing upon higher and holier grounds than any secular contracts. By a large portion
of the Christian world it is believed, and held, to be a sacrament, and is reverenced and
treated as such. Our Blessed Savior says, “a man shall leave his father and mother and
cleave to his wife, and the twain shall be one flesh.”
Campbell’s Adm’r and Heirs v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57, 67 (1869).
It is, of course, the abandonment of this sense of transcendent importance to the marital relationship that
is at the heart of the modern crisis.
106. Kent, supra note 74, at 101.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 102.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 104. On the English practice, see Grey’s discussion, supra note 64.
111. Kent, supra note 74, at 104.
112. Id. at 104-105.
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and it is probably an indictable offence in most, if not all of the states in
the union.”113
Writing near the close of the nineteenth century, Joel Bishop was
more explicit in his reasons why parties to a marriage should be denied
the freedom to dissolve their unions. Marriage, Bishop argued, served the
greatest social goods: “Marriage, being the source of population, of
education, of domestic felicity, – being the all in all without which the
State could not exist, – it is the very highest public interest. Prima facie,
therefore, each particular marriage is beneficial to the public; each
divorce, prejudicial.”114
Bishop continued by connecting these great public goods to the
religious foundations of society and to its deepest ideals:
Evils numberless, extending to the demoralization of society itself,
would follow the abandonment of marriage as a permanent status, and
permitting it to be the subject of experimental and temporary
arrangements and fleeting partnerships. Wisely, therefore, the law holds
it to be a union for life. It is so also in reason, in the common
sentiments of mankind, and in the teachings of religion. No married
partner should desert the other, commit adultery, beat or otherwise
abuse the other, or forbear to do all that is possible for the sustenance
and happiness of the other and of the entire family. Figuratively
speaking, the two should walk hand in hand up the steeps of life and
down its declivities and green slopes, then lay themselves together for
the final sleep at the foot of the hill. Consequently there should be no
divorces, no divorce courts, no books on the law of divorce. In Utopia,
it will be so; it ought to be so in our own country.”115

“But,” Bishop went on, it is not always possible that married partners
remain together all their days.116 He expressed concern that a too
dogmatic and religious approach to divorce, forbidding divorce of every
type in the name of the marital ideal, would end badly.117 He rejected
explicitly the Catholic position that marriage was “indissoluble, or only
to be dissolved by the Pope.”118 Bishop argued, in contrast, that the state
should be empowered to grant decrees of divorce with the right of
remarriage where one of the parties failed to perform the essential
obligations of the marital contract.119 But even where divorce with the
113. Id. at 79.
114. BISHOP, supra note 87, at 16.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 17.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 19. Bishop wrote:
Matrimony is a natural right, to be forfeited, only by some wrongful act. Therefore the
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right of remarriage was granted, Bishop concluded, it should not be
exercised to the detriment of society. “These principles should not be
carried to the extent of impairing the stability of the marriage relation.”120
As support for this proposition, Bishop quoted Chancellor Kent.121
Nineteenth-century case law endorsed these views. The Kentucky
Supreme Court declared in 1841:
Marriage, being more fundamental and important than any of the social
relations, is controlled, as to its obligations, by a peculiar policy
deemed essential to the permanent welfare of the whole social
community. Being a contract for life, indissoluble by the consent of the
parties merely, it should not be dissolved by the sovereign will for any
other causes than such as are subversive of its essential ends or
inconsistent with the general welfare. And it is certainly important to
the general stability and harmony of that relation, that the parties
should know, that, having taken each other with all their infirmities,
and vowed reciprocal fidelity and forbearance for life, it is their
interest, as well as their duty, to ‘bear and forbear’ as far as the
resources of love, philosophy, and religion can enable them.”122

Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
wrote: “The law, in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, seeks to
render the contract of marriage, when once executed, as far as possible
indissoluble. The great object of marriage in a civilized and Christian
community is to secure the existence and permanence of the family
relation, and to insure the legitimacy of offspring.”123 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court echoed these remarks in 1881,124 as did the New York
Superior Court in 1895.125
In a bigamy prosecution in 1899, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled
against the defendant’s attempt to assert his good faith as a defense:
“Public policy forbids that the permanence of the marriage relation
should depend on anything so precarious and elusive as the mental state
of one of the parties.”126 The Supreme Court of Louisiana wrote in 1900:
government should permit every suitable person to be the husband and wife of another,
who will substantially perform the duties of the marital relation; and when it is in good
faith entered into, and one of the parties without the other’s fault, so far fails in those
duties as practically to frustrate its ends, the government should provide some means
whereby, the failure being established and shown to be permanent, the innocent party
may be freed from the mere legal bond of what has in fact ceased to be marriage.
Id.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Logan v. Logan, 41 Ky. 142, 146 (1841).
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605, 607 (1862).
See Varney v. Varney, 8 N.W. 739, 741 (Wis. 1881).
See Fisk v. Fisk, 34 N.Y.S. 33, 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1895).
Reynolds v. State, 78 N.W. 483, 484 (Neb. 1899).
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“Legislation looks to the permanence of marriage. It is to the best interest
of society that it should be made permanent as far as possible.”
In a debate that calls to mind, to a reader familiar with the medieval
sources, old arguments over whether non-Christians might truly marry,127
nineteenth-century courts debated whether the Native American peoples
possessed valid marriage. This debate turned in substantial degree on the
perceived permanence or impermanence of Indian marriage. In Roche v.
Washington, the Indiana Supreme Court confronted the question whether
marriage among the Miami tribe was valid where, the court stated,
custom and practice allowed couples to separate “by consent.”128
The Court felt compelled to consult the “jus gentium” – the “law of
peoples” – to determine the meaning of marriage:
What, then, constitutes the thing called a marriage? What is it in the eye
of the jus gentium? It is the union of one man and one woman, “so long
as they both shall live,” to the exclusion of all others, by an obligation
which, during that time, the parties can not, of their own volition and
act, dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by the authority of the
State. Nothing short of this is a marriage.129

Other courts were more willing to extend legal recognition to the
matrimonial relations of Native American peoples. Thus, the ante-bellum
Alabama Supreme Court upheld Choctaw marriage where the tribe was
“governed by their own chiefs and laws,”130 while the Tennessee
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the Cherokee
nation.131 These two decisions, relying on positivist, not natural-law
analysis, premised their holdings on the law-making authority vested in
tribal government. A quarter-century later, however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion with respect to the
Cherokee people: because “the tribe had professed Christianity [before
the marriage in question],” and because “most of the marriages had been
solemnized by a Justice of the Peace,” permanence was to be imputed as
an element of Cherokee marriage.132
Harsh in their application of “white man’s law” to Native peoples,
echoing, all unconsciously, the commentaries of various twelfth- and
thirteenth-century writers on the marital rights of unbelievers, these
127. Hugh of St. Victor, a prominent twelfth-century writer on marriage, proposed that nonChristians as well as Christians might truly marry provided they take one another for purposes of
procreation, keep faith with one another, love each other as companions, and provide for their mutual
needs. See Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis Fidei Christianae, 176 PATROLOGIA LATINA 505.
128. See Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53, 55 (1862).
129. Id. at 57.
130. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1845).
131. See Morgan v. M’Ghee, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 13 (1844).
132. State v. Ta-Cha-Na-Tah, 64 N.C. 614, 616 (1870).
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decisions nevertheless serve as evidence of the commitment of American
courts to permanence as an essential element of marriage. To be sure,
some courts were more reluctant than others in endorsing a strict notion
of marital permanence,133 but ideas of no-fault or free divorce were very
far from the nineteenth-century judicial mind. Permanence, like
procreation, like fidelity, was to be ranked among the essential elements
of matrimonial union.
The nineteenth-century lawyers and judges did not cite St.
Augustine. They did not borrow directly from his treatise on the goods of
marriage. Rather, it is clear, they operated within a mental universe
defined by the parameters first laid down by St. Augustine and
elaborated upon and systematized by generations of medieval and early
modern ecclesiastical lawyers. Compelled by the absence of specialized
ecclesiastical tribunals to entrust marriage to the protection of the state,
these writers nevertheless saw marriage as something that was not
merely state-created. Its essential elements – procreation, fidelity, and
permanence – were part of a natural ordering of society. Too great
departure from these norms, it was believed, could lead to calamitous
social consequences.
IV. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS OF MARRIAGE AND THE SAME-SEX
DECISIONS
In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Baker v. Nelson,
confronted the issue of same-sex marriage. Two “[p]etitioners, Richard
John Baker and James Michael McConnell, both adult male persons,
made application” for a marriage license from the duly constituted
authorities and were denied “on the sole ground that petitioners were of
the same sex.”134 The petitioners sought to have the licensing statute
declared unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses.135
The Court answered by looking to the Augustinian goods of
marriage – specifically, the good of procreation, as recognized by the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court:
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as

133. See Bauman v. Bauman, 18 Ark. 320 (1857), which notes that the distinction between divorce
a mensa et thoro and divorce a vinculo had largely lost significance in Arkansas, and which recommends
that the right of remarriage be freely granted to innocent parties “in cases of adultery, malicious desertion,
long absence, or capital enmities . . . .” Id. at 325 (quoting a report of ecclesiastics made at the time of
King Edward VI of England).
134. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
135. Id., at 186.
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old as the book of Genesis. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942),
which invalidated Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act on
equal protection grounds, stated in part: “Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” This
historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted
contemporary concept of marriage and social interests for which
petitioners contend.136

Three years later, in 1974, the Washington Court of Appeals
confronted the issue of same-sex marriage and responded, as had Baker
v. Nelson, with an invocation of the good of procreation:
In the instant case, it is apparent that the state’s refusal to grant a
license allowing the appellants to marry one another is not based upon
appellants’ status as males, but rather it is based upon the state’s
recognition that our society as a whole views marriage as the
appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of
children. This is true even though married couples are not required to
become parents and even though some couples are incapable of
becoming parents and even though not all couples who produce
children are married. These, however, are exceptional situations. The
fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution
primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation of
the human race.137

But as we know, at the same time Baker v. Nelson and Singer v.
Hara were decided the relationship of marriage to the traditional goods
ascribed to it by St. Augustine, by the medieval Catholic and the early
modern Anglican canon lawyers and by the American common lawyers
of the nineteenth century was under serious assault. Procreation was in
the process of being disconnected from marriage; laws against adultery
were only rarely and haphazardly enforced;138 divorce came to be much
136. Id.
137. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
138. In 1983, the Massachusetts adultery statute was found to be constitutional even though it was
concededly only rarely enforced. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, , 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983). The
Court acknowledged that “the crime of adultery is rarely made the subject of criminal prosecution.” Id. at
360. Even so, the Court declared: “The statute remains as a permissible expression of public policy.” Id.
at 361. What that policy was remained unarticulated by the Court. Rather, the Court suggested that it
belonged to the legislature to change the policy, not the judiciary.
A similar constitutional challenge to the Utah adultery statute on privacy grounds was rejected by federal
district court. See Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465 (D.Utah 1995). The Court
admonished that privacy was a doctrine that required the imposition of carefully-drawn limitations: “To
some extent balancing is essential. Modern life is urbanized and communal and requires restriction of
some individual interests in order for all citizens to be able to enjoy a reasonable life. Harmony dictates
some limitation on individual interests. An absolute right of privacy would be a form of anarchy.” Id. at
1478. The Court concluded that rights of intimate association were not without limits. It looked to the
language of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) for guidance on the proper boundaries of
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more freely granted, especially on no-fault grounds. Marriage, it was
observed, had gone from being the highest sort of contract, one in which
the whole of society had an interest in maintaining, to being of lesser
status than any other contract, since it was terminable at the will of either
party.139 Today, of course, who could even contemplate a return to
prosecution for adultery, or to the restrictive divorce laws that prevailed
at the time of Kent or Bishop? Indeed, a persuasive argument can be
made that the relaxation of the laws, especially those concerning divorce,
has had some beneficient social consequences, allowing parties to depart
from abusive relationships that were destructive to the parties but that did
not fit the standard grounds of divorce.
But our concern today is not with tracing these developments,
which would be a long and arduous undertaking. It would also ultimately
be a distraction from our central thesis. Rather, we are concerned with
identifying the alternative marital theory proposed by the Hawaii and
Vermont Supreme Courts.
A nineteenth-century writer like Chancellor Kent commenced his
analysis of marriage with the structure and demands of the natural law
firmly in mind. Neither legislators nor courts had the right or power to
“make” the law of marriage. Rather, it was their solemn duty to
recognize and give legal force to a pattern already laid down in the
natural order.140 This pattern, as outlined above, embraced the
Augustinian goods of procreation, fidelity, and unity.
When one turns to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr
v. Lewin, on the other hand, one finds a court that has arrogated to the
state the full authority over determining what constitutes a marriage.141
“The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function reserved
exclusively to the respective states,” the Baehr Court declared.142
By its very nature, the power to regulate the marriage relation includes
the power to determine the requisites of a valid marriage contract and
to control the qualifications of the contracting parties, the forms and
procedures necessary to solemnize the marriage, the duties and

privacy interests. “Nothing suggests the privacy interest recognized in Griswold could encompass a right
to a sexual relationship outside of marriage or one contrary to marital integrity. No right to perform an act
of marital infidelity was even alluded to in the majority opinion.” Oliverson, 875 F. Supp. at 1480.
The reluctance of the Massachusetts Court and the labors of the Utah Court, demonstrate that even
though adultery statutes might survive constitutional scrutiny, their continued vitality remain subject to
legal challenge.
139. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 255, 265,
273-274 (1973).
140. See supra notes 73-85, and accompanying text.
141. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
142. Id. at 58.
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obligations it creates, its effect upon property and other rights, and the
grounds for marital dissolution.143

The Baehr Court acknowledged contrary authority to its totalistic
claims on behalf of the state’s control of the marital relationship. It
quoted Jones v. Hallahan’s pronouncement that “Marriage was a custom
long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose. . . .
[M]arriage has always been considered as a union of a man and a
woman. . . .”144 Baehr, however, never addressed the implications of this
insight, preferring rather to see in the Jones case a failure to address the
equal protection issue supposedly inherent in this understanding of
marriage.145 It noted also the Washington Court of Appeals’ denial of a
marriage license to a same-sex couple in Singer v. Hara.146 The Singer
Court had written regarding the same-sex appellants that they “were not
denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a
marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself.”147
The Baehr Court’s response to these invocations of a natural order
to the marital relationship was to exalt the power of the state: “marriage
is a state-conferred legal status, the existence of which gives rise to rights
and benefits reserved exclusively to that relationship.”148 The Court left
no room for Chancellor Kent or Joel Bishop in the face of this
declaration of state power. The Singer Court’s reasoning was specifically
denounced as “tortured and conclusory sophistry.”149
Gone from this understanding of marriage is any notion of
teleology. There is no sense that marriage exists to serve particular
purposes or that it is intended to fulfill certain goods. This failure to
appreciate that marriage might serve some positive social good emerges
full-blown in the court’s definition of marriage. The Baehr Court wrote:
“This court construes marriage as ‘a partnership to which both parties
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and
efforts.’”150
Absent from this definition is any notion of procreation, or the
fidelity or loyalty owed by one partner to the other, or the partnership for
life that the parties are expected to share. The definition the court
proposes is virtually indistinguishable from the definition one might
143. Id.
144. Id. at 61 (quoting Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 63 (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P. 2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied 84 Wash.
2d 1008 (1974)).
147. Id. at 63 (quoting Singer, 522 P. 2d at 1196).
148. Id. at 58.
149. Id. at 63.
150. Id. at 58 (quoting Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 483, 836 P.2d 484, 491 (1992)).
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accord a business partnership between two persons. Eliminate the word
“both” and it might include a committee charged with planning a Fourth
of July celebration, or a school board setting its budget. Indeed, it could
embrace nearly all forms of collaborative enterprise.
But this “state-conferred status,” this “partnership to which both
parties bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies
and efforts,” nevertheless was the vehicle through which the state
conferred certain benefits. By privileging, as it were, heterosexual
poolings of financial resources and individual energy, other forms of
partnership were denied access to benefits. These include tax benefits,
access to the courts for spousal support, or child custody, and rights to
property division, among other benefits.151 If marriage has any purpose,
on this analysis, it is to facilitate the distribution of state-controlled
benefits. It has become, according to the Hawaii Supreme Court, one
more social-welfare program.
Baker v. State, the Vermont decision of 1999, takes a much more
sophisticated approach to the meaning of marriage.152 The litigants in
Baker, same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, conceded that
marriage in Vermont traditionally encompassed heterosexual unions and
served the purposes of procreation and child-rearing.153 The plaintiffs,
however, wished to shift the premises. Regarding procreation, plaintiffs
contended that a prohibition on same-sex unions failed to serve the
state’s interest, given “the large number of married couples without
children, and the increasing incidence of same-sex couples with
children . . . .”154 Plaintiffs proposed an alternative understanding of the
nature of the marital relationship: “They argue[d] . . . that the underlying
purpose of marriage is to protect and encourage the union of committed
couples and that, absent an explicit legislative prohibition, the statutes
should be interpreted broadly to include committed same-sex couples.”155
The Court, however, elected to ground its decision not on the
statutory scheme authorizing and supporting the marital relationship, but
on the Vermont Constitution’s “Common Benefits Clause.”156 Like the
Hawaii Court before it, the Vermont Supreme Court viewed marriage in
terms of the benefits it conferred. And the Vermont Constitution
prohibited discrimination in the conferral of benefits:

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 59.
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
Id. at 869-70.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id.
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The concept of equality at the core of the Common Benefits Clause was
not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but rather the
elimination of artificial governmental preferments and advantages. The
Vermont Constitution would ensure that the law uniformly afforded
every Vermonter its benefit, protection, and security, so that social and
political preeminence would reflect differences of capacity, disposition,
and virtue, rather than governmental favor and privilege.157

If an equal distribution of benefits is the norm, the Court
reasoned, and the status of marriage offered substantial benefits,158 then
“any statutory exclusion [of a group of persons] must necessarily be
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority
that the justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned.”159
The state of Vermont countered by asserting its interest in
providing for the raising of the next generation:
The State has a strong interest, it argues, in promoting a permanent
commitment between couples who have children to ensure that their
offspring are considered legitimate and receive ongoing parental
support. The State contends, further, that the Legislature could
reasonably believe that sanctioning same-sex unions “would diminish
society’s perception of the link between procreation and child
rearing . . . [and] advance the notion that fathers or mothers . . . are
mere surplusage to the functions of procreation and child rearing.”160

The Court responded by asserting, in effect, that the State’s
purported justification was both under and over inclusive. On the one
hand, the Court noted, there are “many opposite-sex couples [who] marry
for reasons unrelated to procreation, [and] some of these couples never
intend to have children, and . . . others are incapable of having
children.”161 On the other hand, “there is no dispute that a significant
number of children are actually being raised by same-sex parents, and
that increasing numbers of children are being conceived by such parents
through a variety of techniques.”162 In a sense, the Court asserted, the
state’s interest in procreation might even be served by permitting samesex marriage.163
157. Id. at 876-77.
158. Id. at 883-84. The Court provides a comprehensive list of marital benefits, including the
spousal share of the estate, intestate provisions, the right to sue for wrongful death or loss of consortium,
joint ownership of property, and a host of other benefits.
159. Id. at 884.
160. Id. at 881.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 882
Therefore, to the extent that the state’s purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to
legitimize children and provide for their security, the statutes plainly exclude many same-
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Ultimately, however, the Vermont Court, like the Hawaii Court,
did not define marriage as serving a procreative end. This was one of a
number of possible purposes for marriage, and one that the parties
themselves might freely accept or renounce. After all, the Court
observed, there are are many who marry who never intend to have
children.164 Although taking greater cognizance than Baehr of the state’s
interest in procreation, the Vermont Court, in the final analysis, viewed
marriage as a kind of co-mingling of state-conferred benefits on the one
hand and mutual affection between the parties, on the other:
While many have noted the symbolic or spiritual significance of the
marital relation, it is plaintiffs’ claim to the secular benefits and
protections of a singularly human relationship that, in our view,
characterizes this case. The State’s interest in extending official
recognition and legal protection to the professed commitment of two
individuals to a lasting relationship of mutual affection is predicated on
the belief that legal support of a couple’s commitment provides

sex couples who are no different from opposite-sex couples with respect to these
objectives. If anything, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal protections
incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that the State argues the
marriage laws are designed to secure against.
Id.
The Catholic Church’s teaching on artificial means of reproduction is to see it as morally unacceptable for
several reasons, chief among them the severance of the procreative act from the natural sexual union of
the parties to a marriage. According to the Catholic Catechism:
Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and wife, by the intrusion of a person
other than the couple (donation of sperm, or ovum, surrogate uterus) are gravely immoral.
These techniques (heterologous artificial insemination and fertilization) infringe the
child’s right to be born of a father and mother known to him and bound to each other by a
marriage. They betray the spouse’s “right to become a father and a mother only through
each other.” (Quoting DONUM VITAE, intro., 2).
Techniques involving only the married couple (homologous artificial insemination and
fertilization) are perhaps less reprehensible, yet remain morally unacceptable. They
dissociate the sexual act from the procreative act. The act which brings the child into
existence is no longer an act by which two persons give themselves to one another, but
one that “entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and
biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the
human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and
equality that must be common to parents and children.” (Quoting DONUM VITAE, II.5).
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, paras. 2376-2377, p. 571 (2d ed., 1997).
164. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. St. Augustine, for his part, found it impossible to
characterize as marriage a relationship between those who have affirmatively taken steps to frustrate
permanently the conception or birth of children. See DE BONO CONIUGALI, sec. 5.5, p. 1011 (Walsh
edition). This teaching remains a foundation of the Catholic canon law of marriage. Canon 1055, sec. 1 of
the Latin-rite Code of Canon Law (1983) provides that marriage serves the good of the spouses and the
procreation and offspring of children. Exclusion of the good of children, or the goods of fidelity or
indissolubility, will result in an invalid marriage. See C. 1101 (1983 Code of Canon Law). See also THE
CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY (James Coriden, et al., eds., 1985), at 784-787.
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V. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS: DO THEY RETAIN VITALITY?
In Standhardt v. Superior Court, an action brought by two males
seeking a marriage license so as to marry one another, a division of the
Arizona Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the recent
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas required recognition of
homosexual marriage.166 The Court first determined that Lawrence did
not mandate that homosexual unions must be accorded the status of
marriage.167 Indeed, the Standhardt Court observed that Lawrence had
explicitly declared that “the case before it ‘[did] not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.’”168
The Court then considered the legal contours of the marital
relationship. The Court looked to Maynard v. Hill for guidance on the
societal value marriage retained. Marriage, the Standhardt Court quoted,
“‘creat[ed] the most important relation in life . . . having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution.’”169
The Court then rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to connect their claim
with the fundamental-rights analysis of Loving v. Virginia.170 “Implicit in
Loving and predecessor opinions is the notion that marriage, often linked
to procreation, is a union forged between one man and one woman.”171
The Standhardt Court continued:
Thus, while Loving expanded the traditional scope of the fundamental
right to marry by granting interracial couples unrestricted access to the
state-sanctioned marriage institution, that decision was anchored to the
concept of marriage as a union involving persons of the opposite sex. In
contrast, recognizing a right to marry someone of the same sex would
not expand the established right to marry, but would redefine the legal
meaning of “marriage.”172

The Standhardt Court did not explicitly endorse the procreative
purposes of marriage. It did acknowledge that legislative protection of

165. Baker, 744 A.2d at 888-89.
166. See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); cf. Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
167. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458.
168. Id. at 456 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484).
169. Id. at 458 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205).
170. Id.; cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
171. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458.
172. Id. at 458.
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this policy was not outside the boundary of judicial protection. The Court
stressed the importance of history to its analysis: “The history of the
law’s treatment of marriage as an institution involving one man and one
woman, together with recent, explicit reaffirmations of that view, lead
invariably to the conclusion that the right to enter a same-sex marriage is
not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process.”173
One is entitled to ask whether the Augustinian goods retain
vitality. Standhardt suggests that they continue to exert some influence.
But Standhardt, in the final analysis, does not mount a robust defense of
the traditional marital goods. History, tradition, and judicial deference to
legislative policy are the values that seem to dominate Standhardt’s
analysis, not an express solicitude for the traditional goals of the marital
relationship. One must ask the question, without here answering it,
whether such values are sufficient judicial protection of the marital
relationship.

173. Id. at 460.

